A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology

Notes

1. See, for instance, Feenberg (1995), Feenberg (1999) and Ihde (1990).

2. Leiss (1972).

3. Habermas (1970), p. 92.

4. Zvelebil (1984), p. 314, cited in DeGregori (1985), p. 14.

5. See also DeGregori (1985), pp. 14 ff.

6. Simpson (1995), p. 4.

7. On the idea of encountering the world as a resource for manipulation and use (Bestand), see Heidegger (1977).

8. DeGregori (1985), p. 37.

9. See Kranzberg and Pursell (1967), p. 18.

10. Hughes (1976), p. 651; and O. Mayr (1976), p. 667. Further complicating this problem is the fact that what at a given time is taken to be the science–technology distinction may be in part a social construction, may be determined by what society judges to be practical and irrelevant to practice at a given time. See Reingold and Molella (1976), p. 629, and Mayr (1976), p. 664.

11. See Bunge (1972), pp. 63, 68–70. Those who would reject the salience of the cognitive/practical distinction here – and that would include both those whose view of science is informed by some version of instrumentalism or pragmatism and those influenced by some trends within the Frankfurt School of critical theory or in the thought of Husserl, Heidegger and Max Scheler – and who would claim that science itself is but a device for technical control and manipulation, face the challenge of giving an adequate account of the different criteria of success that characterize what are generally acknowledged to be the distinguishable enterprises of science and technology. Though social ...