Preface
There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files. This book is about the latter.
If I take a letter, lock it in a safe, hide the safe somewhere in New York, then tell you to read the letter, that's not security. That's obscurity. On the other hand, if I take a letter and lock it in a safe, and then give you the safe along with the design specifications of the safe and a hundred identical safes with their combinations so that you and the world's best safecrackers can study the locking mechanism—and you still can't open the safe and read the letter—that's security.
For many years, this sort of cryptography was the exclusive domain of the military. The United States' National Security Agency (NSA), and its counterparts in the former Soviet Union, England, France, Israel, and elsewhere, have spent billions of dollars in the very serious game of securing their own communications while trying to break everyone else's. Private individuals, with far less expertise and budget, have been powerless to protect their own privacy against these governments.
During the last 20 years, public academic research in cryptography has exploded. While classical cryptography has been long used by ordinary citizens, computer cryptography was the exclusive domain of the world's militaries since World War II. Today, state–of–the–art computer cryptography ...
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