Cyber Operations

Section IICyber Effects Conclusions

II.1 Cyber Effects Overview

As reviewed in this section, operations in cyberspace produce effects that span the strategic, tactical, and criminal domains. Categorization is sometimes a challenge due to the team, target, tool, and effect having linkages stemming from more than one domain (Figure II.1).

As shown in Figure II.1, multiple operations over the last few decades have provided example operations in the strategic, tactical, and criminal areas. In addition, for STUXNET (2010) and Operation Orchard (2007), we have analogs from the kinetic warfighting domain that help us with estimating rough resource ratios. And rough estimates in the strategic and tactical realms provide multipliers in terms resource investments. Resource multipliers are assumed as a given in the criminal domain with the DPRK and ransomware gangs netting billions of dollars from companies and individuals.

Providing campaign level analysis, a challenge to even the most data centric of organizations, is even more challenging when making a comparison that crosses traditional warfighting and intelligence boundaries. We were therefore aided, here, in Whaley’s analogous loss exchange rate (LER) advantages estimated to be due to the single factor of deception. Whaley’s study of kinetic military campaigns for the last few centuries provided us with a 15:1 LER advantage, attributed to the winning opponent’s use of deception. We also found similar financial cost ratios for the ...