Driving Climate Change

regularly publicize new technologies and other activities promising emis-

sions reductions.

Nevertheless, automakers have yet to make significant progress in

cutting CO

2

emissions in the United States, the world’s largest auto market.

With few exceptions, their strategies have made emissions worse. Major

product trends, such as the shift to light trucks, have been driving CO

2

emis-

sions rates higher. Some policies rationalized under the guise of reductions,

such as the FFV credits, are actually aggravating the adverse CO

2

emissions

trends as well as increasing U.S. oil consumption. Although HEVs offer a

ray of hope, assessing their influence using the metric of fleetwide carbon

burden indicates that any one technology, even an advanced and promising

one, can do little to offset broad market trends that continue to push emis-

sions upward.

The missing part of the auto industry’s role in cutting carbon burdens

is a constructive stance on public policy. Government intervention is

essential for resolving the inherent tension between market forces and

nonmarket concerns such as global warming and energy security. As this

analysis has shown, technology strategies alone are unlikely to address the

auto sector’s CO

2

emissions problem. Automakers need to embrace bal-

anced but meaningful regulation in order to be true to their promises to

address these public concerns. There is no other way to break out of the

competitive box that binds product strategies and design priorities to offer-

ing consumers almost every variation imaginable, but doing very little

to address the huge, nonmarket problems of global warming and oil

dependence.

Automakers rightly point out that lack of customer interest is a barrier

to higher fuel economy, in contrast to when CAFE standards were estab-

lished during the oil crisis in the 1970s. Indeed, an extensive public educa-

tion effort to make fuel efficiency matter more to consumers is needed as

part of a broader public strategy to realign market signals and establish U.S.

leadership in addressing oil consumption and global warming. The auto

industry’s cooperation and expertise could help guide such endeavors, but

effective steps seem unlikely until automakers take a more positive

approach in helping establish a binding U.S. greenhouse gas reduction

policy. A good faith effort on the industry’s part would open the door to

developing more comprehensive solutions for the cars versus climate

challenge.

References

Davis, S. C., and S. W. Diegel. Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 24. Report ORNL-

6973. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, December 2004.

DeCicco, J., F. Fung, and F. An. Automakers’ Corporate Carbon Burdens: Update for

1990–2003. New York: Environmental Defense, August 2005.

Hellman, K., and R. M. Heavenrich. Light-Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy

Trends: 1975 Through 2004. Report No. EPA 420-R-04-001. Ann Arbor, MI: U.S. Environ-

86 Driving Climate Change

mental Protection Agency, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, Advanced Technology

Division, April 2004.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Summary of Fuel Economy Performance.

Washington, D.C.: National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration, March

2005.

U.S. Department of Transportation. Report to Congress: Effects of the Alternative Motor Fuels

Act CAFE Incentives Policy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, March

2002.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and

Sinks: 1990–2003. Report No. EPA 430-R-05-003. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, April 2005.

World Business Council for Sustainable Development. Mobility 2030: Meeting the Challenges

to Sustainability. Geneva: World Business Council for Sustainable Development

(www.wbcsd.org), 2004.

Carbon Burdens from New Car Sales in the United States 87

This page intentionally left blank