Emergent Behavior in Complex Systems Engineering

Chapter 1METAPHYSICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ACCOUNTS OF EMERGENCE: VARIETIES OF FUNDAMENTALITY AND THEORETICAL COMPLETENESS

John Symons

Department of Philosophy, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 66045, USA

SUMMARY

The concept of emergence figures prominently in contemporary science. It has roots in philosophical reflection on the nature of fundamentality and novelty that took place in the early decades of the twentieth century. Although it is no longer necessary to offer philosophical defenses of the science of emergent properties, attention to basic metaphysical questions remains important for engineering and scientific purposes. Most importantly, this chapter argues for precision with respect to what scientists and engineers take to count as fundamental for the sake of their uses of the concept of emergence.

INTRODUCTION

Two defining characteristics, novelty and naturalness, mark the concept of emergence. When emergent properties are first instantiated, they are said to be novel in some difficult to specify, but presumably nontrivial, sense. Although every moment of natural history is new in the sense of being at least at a different time from what came before, the kind of novelty that is associated with emergent properties is understood to constitute a metaphysically significant difference. What might that significance amount to? Very roughly, we can say that if an emergent property appears, there is a new kind of entity or property on the scene. Not just more of the same. ...