Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Safety

Book description

This book discusses the specifics of safety regulations regarding nuclear risk and how experts contribute to the safety of nuclear installations. Drawing on research conducted in collaboration with the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), the ideas that are put forward rely on a review of the practices of specialists in human and organizational factors concerning nuclear safety. The author shows that the French approach depends on maintaining a technical dialogue between the regulatory authority (ASN), IRSN and nuclear operators. This method of risk management is known as "French cooking" in the Anglo-Saxon world, where a more formal regulatory approach is taken. This technical dialogue does however hold certain benefits, particularly in the field of human and organizational factors, where it allows an advancement of the state of knowledge, which remains incomplete. After the Fukushima accident, in the face of an ongoing European and global re-evaluation of the safety of nuclear power and alignment towards the Anglo-Saxon standard, the French cooking approach may yet be able to make a significant contribution. This work will be of interest to all involved in nuclear power engineering and in the field of risk management and nuclear safety.

Includes a preface by Jacques Repussard, Director General, IRSN, France, and a postface by Erik Hollnagel, Professor, Institute of Regional Health Research, University of Southern Denmark / Chief Consultant, Centre for Quality, Region of Southern Denmark.

Table of contents

  1. Front Cover
  2. Contents
  3. PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH VERSION
  4. PREFACE
  5. INTRODUCTION (1/4)
  6. INTRODUCTION (2/4)
  7. INTRODUCTION (3/4)
  8. INTRODUCTION (4/4)
  9. PART ONE. TECHNICAL DIALOGUE AND HUMAN FACTORS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
    1. CHAPTER 1. THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (1/6)
    2. CHAPTER 1. THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (2/6)
    3. CHAPTER 1. THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (3/6)
    4. CHAPTER 1. THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (4/6)
    5. CHAPTER 1. THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (5/6)
    6. CHAPTER 1. THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (6/6)
    7. CHAPTER 2. INCORPORATION OF HUMAN FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT PROCESSES (1/4)
    8. CHAPTER 2. INCORPORATION OF HUMAN FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT PROCESSES (2/4)
    9. CHAPTER 2. INCORPORATION OF HUMAN FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT PROCESSES (3/4)
    10. CHAPTER 2. INCORPORATION OF HUMAN FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT PROCESSES (4/4)
    11. CONCLUSION TO PART ONE: HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES OF HUMAN FACTORS ASSESSMENTS?
  10. PART TWO. THE ASSESSMENT FACTORY (1/2)
  11. PART TWO. THE ASSESSMENT FACTORY (2/2)
    1. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (1/8)
    2. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (2/8)
    3. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (3/8)
    4. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (4/8)
    5. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (5/8)
    6. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (6/8)
    7. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (7/8)
    8. CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MINOTAURE SAFETY REVIEW (8/8)
    9. CHAPTER 4. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS AT ARTÉMIS (1/7)
    10. CHAPTER 4. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS AT ARTÉMIS (2/7)
    11. CHAPTER 4. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS AT ARTÉMIS (3/7)
    12. CHAPTER 4. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS AT ARTÉMIS (4/7)
    13. CHAPTER 4. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS AT ARTÉMIS (5/7)
    14. CHAPTER 4. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS AT ARTÉMIS (6/7)
    15. CHAPTER 4. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS AT ARTÉMIS (7/7)
    16. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1/11)
    17. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (2/11)
    18. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (3/11)
    19. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (4/11)
    20. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (5/11)
    21. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (6/11)
    22. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (7/11)
    23. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (8/11)
    24. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (9/11)
    25. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (10/11)
    26. CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE SKILLS OF OPERATING PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (11/11)
    27. CONCLUSION TO PART TWO: THE SINGULAR ASPECTS OF THE ASSESSMENT FACTORY
  12. PART THREE. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSESSMENT
    1. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (1/9)
    2. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (2/9)
    3. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (3/9)
    4. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (4/9)
    5. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (5/9)
    6. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (6/9)
    7. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (7/9)
    8. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (8/9)
    9. CHAPTER 6. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE: THE RHETORICAL AND COGNITIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT (9/9)
    10. CHAPTER 7. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT — MASTERING THE STRENGTHS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (1/4)
    11. CHAPTER 7. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT — MASTERING THE STRENGTHS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (2/4)
    12. CHAPTER 7. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT — MASTERING THE STRENGTHS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (3/4)
    13. CHAPTER 7. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSESSMENT — MASTERING THE STRENGTHS OF TECHNICAL DIALOGUE (4/4)
    14. CONCLUSION TO PART THREE: RESTORING THE BALANCE OF THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS
  13. GENERAL CONCLUSION (1/2)
  14. GENERAL CONCLUSION (2/2)
  15. POSTFACE
  16. REFERENCES (1/2)
  17. REFERENCES (2/2)
  18. Back Cover

Product information

  • Title: Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Safety
  • Author(s): Gregory Rolina
  • Release date: August 2013
  • Publisher(s): CRC Press
  • ISBN: 9780203768877