18 Notions
1.5.1 Moral hazard and time consistency
A distinction is drawn between the origin of moral hazard (1.5.1.1) and its con-
sequences for nancial stability (1.5.1.2).
1.5.1.1 Origin of moral hazard
Alessandri and Haldane (2009) indicate that the introduction of a safety net for
banks is at the origin of an asymmetric payo (i.e. a situation in which they stand
more to gain than to lose). The safety net is made of three elements:
• The liquidity insurance, provided by the intervention of the central bank as
the lender of last resort, which is the oldest element (Chapter 9);
• Deposit insurance, introduced rst in the US in 1934 and then generalized
(Chapter 5);
• Capital insurance, as the Government intervenes to bail out banks which ...