Optimal commodity tax (continued)
U.S. taxes, optimal, 472±474
necessity exemption, 435±436
one-consumer economy with general
technology, 458±461
ordinary demand relationships, 436±437
policy implications, 432
private information, 489±503
direct/indirect tax mix, 502±503
Sah model of maximum redistribution,
489±493
Stiglitz model of pareto-eYcient taxation,
493±502
two-class tax rule, 471±472
Optimal federalism
competition problem, 842
grants-in-aid
Wrst-best policy environment, 893±894
LeGrand guidelines, 899±903
redistribution via matching grants,
903±905
second-best policy environment, 894±898
local social welfare functions, 848
mobility models, see also Fiscal federalism,
redistribution, and Tiebout
modeling dimensions, 856±859
potential incompatibilities, 842±843
prevailing model, criticisms
decreasing-cost services, 843±845
politics and social welfare function,
845±846
redistributions in reality, 847±848
redistribution, 841±842, 848±853
Stigler's prescription, 835±836
Tiebout's beliefs, 855±856
Optimal government production,
Diamond±Mirrlees problem, 699±701
Optimal income tax
Besley and Jewitt, broad based taxation,
433±435
Mirrlees model, 503±512
Okun's leaky bucket, 503±504
overview, 493±494
PPH Wrst-best methodology, 511±512
preferences, 495±496
self-selection constraints, 496±497
Stiglitz pareto-eYcient model, 493±502
U-shaped tax schedule, 508±511
Optimal investment rules, decreasing cost
production, see also Decreasing cost
production
Optimal pricing rule, decreasing cost
production, 278±279
Overlapping generations model, see also
Dynamic tax incidence
Pareto-eYcient tax, self-selection constraints,
493±502
Pareto±optimal conditions
Wrst-best analysis, 70
government eYciency, 9
public sector analysis, 37±39
social welfare maximization, 46, 48, 55±56
Pareto±optimal redistributions
Wrst-best theory of taxation, 320±321
assistance to poor, 313±315
overall distribution of income, 311±313
overview, 309±311
Wrst-best transfers, 632±633
Partial equilibrium analysis
tax incidence, 524±525
welfare loss measurement, 403±404
Partial tax, aggregate production externalities,
223
Pauly model, housing market, 866±869
Payroll tax, social security, Pechman±Okner
studies, 589
Pechman±Okner studies, economy-wide tax
incidence
corporation income taxes, 590±592
local property taxes, 590±592
payroll tax for social security, 589
personal income taxes, 588
sales and excise taxes, 589±590
Pecuniary externalities, 147
Penalty, tax evasion, 515
Perfect competition, social welfare
maximization, 55±56
Personal income tax
e
Yciency
cost, 419±429
federal, see also Federal personal income tax
Haig±Simons criterion, 362±363
horizontal equity, 365±367
ineYciency, 368±370
Pechman±Okner studies, 588
tax capitalization, 365±367
tax loopholes, 364±370
vertical equity, 368±370
Pigovian tax
aggregate externalities
basic caveats, 200±202
interpersonal equity conditions, 195
overview, 194±195
pareto±optimal conditions, 195±198
trial and error solution, 198±200
942 INDEX

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