Public Finance, 2nd Edition

conditions that are derived from them. The disposition of Pigovian tax

revenues may be taken into consideration by the government when it redis-

tributes, but it is irrelevant to determining the Wnal distribution of income.

Nonetheless, resistance to tolls and other forms of externality taxes is quite

vocal, perhaps because people do not believe that the government has a fully

articulated distributional policy. Therefore, they react more to their direct

gains and losses from the government's allocational policies than to the

eYciency gains from the policies.

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6. CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES 203

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