Social Insurance
Medical Care
Abstract
Chapter 20 is the first of two chapters on social insurance, using health insurance as the example throughout. It begins with an analysis of the demand for health insurance and then turns to the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that derive from private or asymmetric information. Featured are Pauly’s analysis of moral hazard, the Cutler and Einav and Finkelstein analyses of adverse selection, and the Rothschild and Stiglitz demonstration that the market for health insurance might not have an equilibrium. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).
Keywords
Actuarially fair insurance; Advantageous selection; Adverse selection; ...Get Public Finance, 3rd Edition now with the O’Reilly learning platform.
O’Reilly members experience books, live events, courses curated by job role, and more from O’Reilly and nearly 200 top publishers.
