Book description
The question of how cooperation and social order can evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature of a “war of all against all” has always been at the core of social scientific inquiry. Social dilemmas are the main analytical paradigm used by social scientists to explain competition, cooperation, and conflict in human groups. The formal analysis of social dilemmas allows for identifying the conditions under which cooperation evolves or unravels. This knowledge informs the design of institutions that promote cooperative behavior. Yet to gain practical relevance in policymaking and institutional design, predictions derived from the analysis of social dilemmas must be put to an empirical test. The collection of articles in this book gives an overview of state-of-the-art research on social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation. It covers theoretical contributions and offers a broad range of examples on how theoretical insights can be empirically verified and applied to cooperation problems in everyday life. By bringing together a group of distinguished scholars, the book fills an important gap in sociological scholarship and addresses some of the most interesting questions of human sociality.
Table of contents
- Cover
- Title Page
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Preface
- Contents
- Part I: Foundations
- Part II: Institutions
-
Part III: Social Norms
- When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests?
- Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism?
- Cooperation and Career Chances in Science
- Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions
- The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity
-
Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
- Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment
- Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments
- The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward?
- Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement
- Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise
- Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
- Part VI: Game Theory
- Part VII: Experimental Methods
- Notes on the Editors and Contributors
Product information
- Title: Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation
- Author(s):
- Release date: September 2017
- Publisher(s): De Gruyter Oldenbourg
- ISBN: 9783110470697
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