Andreas Flache, Dieko Bakker, Michael Mäs, and Jacob Dijkstra
The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward?
Note: This work has benefitted from insightful comments by the editors and reviewers, as well as from stimulating discussions with the members of the Norms and Networks research group at the Department of Sociology/ICS of the University of Groningen. Any remaining deficiencies are, of course, sole responsibility of the authors.
Abstract: Peer sanctioning institutions are powerful solutions to the freerider problem in collective action. However, counter-punishment may deter sanctioning, undermining the institution. Peer-reward can be similarly vulnerable, because ...
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