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was “to manipulate his audience so as to secure agreement”
(“Persuasion” 19). But a “turn” in Johnstone’s thinking led him
to acknowledge by 1978 that “the distinction between finding
the truth in philosophy and finding the proper rhetorical devices
for propagating it cannot be maintained” (“Truth” 74). In other
words, “truth” is always and already rhetorical, never severed
from its communication, and thus finding the “truth” requires
holding up a pretense that rhetoric is merely a convenient
accessory that can be dispensed with.
Johnstone’s new perspective of the philosophy–rhetoric
relationship was based in the concept of evocation: “My present
view is that a successful argument in philosophy is one that is
intended to evoke, and does evoke, a response of a certain kind
in the man to whom it is addressed” (“Truth” 75). Johnstone cited
Heidegger as evidence for this view, and his description here of
Heidegger’s language use is consistent with our understanding of
both Heidegger’s and Erhard’s thinking:
That’s why we don’t give you anything to remember. You just have to be.
There’s a new babysitter watching the baby while I’m here and I got a note at the break to call
and I immediately felt terror because six months ago there was an accident that threatened ...

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