book

We Have Root

by Bruce Schneier

September 2019

Beginner

304 pages

8h 22m

English

Wiley

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Cyberconflicts and National SecurityCounterterrorism Mission CreepSyrian Electronic Army CyberattacksThe Limitations of IntelligenceComputer Network Exploitation vs. Computer Network AttackiPhone Encryption and the Return of the Crypto WarsAttack Attribution and Cyber ConflictMetal Detectors at Sports StadiumsThe Future of Ransomware
Hacking AirplanesReassessing Airport Security
Hacking Consumer DevicesSecurity Risks of Embedded SystemsSamsung Television Spies on ViewersVolkswagen and Cheating SoftwareDMCA and the Internet of ThingsReal-World Security and the Internet of ThingsLessons from the Dyn DDoS AttackRegulation of the Internet of ThingsSecurity and the Internet of ThingsBotnetsIoT Cybersecurity: What’s Plan B?
The NSA’s Cryptographic CapabilitiesiPhone Fingerprint AuthenticationThe Future of Incident ResponseDrone Self-Defense and the LawReplacing Judgment with AlgorithmsClass Breaks
Candidates Won’t Hesitate to Use Manipulative Advertising to Score VotesThe Security of Our Election SystemsElection SecurityHacking and the 2016 Presidential Election
Restoring Trust in Government and the InternetThe NSA Is Commandeering the InternetConspiracy Theories and the NSAHow to Remain Secure against the NSAAir GapsWhy the NSA’s Defense of Mass Data Collection Makes No SenseDefending Against Crypto BackdoorsA Fraying of the Public/Private Surveillance PartnershipSurveillance as a Business ModelFinding People’s Locations Based on Their Activities in CyberspaceSurveillance by AlgorithmMetadata = SurveillanceEveryone Wants You to Have Security, But Not from ThemWhy We EncryptAutomatic Face Recognition and SurveillanceThe Internet of Things that Talk about You behind Your BackSecurity vs. SurveillanceThe Value of EncryptionCongress Removes FCC Privacy Protections on Your Internet UsageInfrastructure Vulnerabilities Make Surveillance Easy
More on Feudal SecurityThe Public/Private Surveillance PartnershipShould Companies Do Most of Their Computing in the Cloud?Security Economics of the Internet of Things

Human-Machine Trust FailuresGovernment Secrecy and the Generation GapChoosing Secure PasswordsThe Human Side of HeartbleedThe Security of Data DeletionLiving in a Code Yellow WorldSecurity Design: Stop Trying to Fix the UserSecurity Orchestration and Incident Response
Government Secrets and the Need for WhistleblowersProtecting Against LeakersWhy the Government Should Help LeakersLessons from the Sony HackReacting to the Sony HackAttack Attribution in CyberspaceOrganizational DoxingThe Security Risks of Third-Party DataThe Rise of Political DoxingData Is a Toxic AssetCredential Stealing as an Attack VectorSomeone Is Learning How to Take Down the InternetWho Is Publishing NSA and CIA Secrets, and Why?Who Are the Shadow Brokers?On the Equifax Data Breach
Our Newfound Fear of RiskTake Back the InternetThe Battle for Power on the InternetHow the NSA Threatens National SecurityWho Should Store NSA Surveillance Data?Ephemeral AppsDisclosing vs. Hoarding VulnerabilitiesThe Limits of Police SubterfugeWhen Thinking Machines Break the LawThe Democratization of CyberattackUsing Law against TechnologyDecrypting an iPhone for the FBILawful Hacking and Continuing VulnerabilitiesThe NSA Is Hoarding VulnerabilitiesWannaCry and VulnerabilitiesNSA Document Outlining Russian Attempts to Hack Voter RollsWarrant Protections against Police Searches of Our Data
Chapter 1: Crime, Terrorism, Spying, and WarChapter 2: Travel and SecurityChapter 3: Internet of ThingsChapter 4: Security and TechnologyChapter 5: Elections and VotingChapter 6: Privacy and SurveillanceChapter 7: Business and Economics of SecurityChapter 8: Human Aspects of SecurityChapter 9: Leaking, Hacking, Doxing, and WhistleblowingChapter 10: Security, Policy, Liberty, and Law

Content preview from We Have Root

10Security, Policy, Liberty, and Law

Our Newfound Fear of Risk

Originally published in Forbes.com, August 23, 2013

We’re afraid of risk. It’s a normal part of life, but we’re increasingly unwilling to accept it at any level. So we turn to technology to protect us. The problem is that technological security measures aren’t free. They cost money, of course, but they cost other things as well. They often don’t provide the security they advertise, and—paradoxically—they often increase risk somewhere else. This problem is particularly stark when the risk involves another person: crime, terrorism, and so on. While technology has made us much safer against natural risks like accidents and disease, it works less well against man-made risks.

Three examples:

We have allowed the police to turn themselves into a paramilitary organization. They deploy SWAT teams multiple times a day, almost always in nondangerous situations. They tase people at minimal provocation, often when it’s not warranted. Unprovoked shootings are on the rise. One result of these measures is that honest mistakes—a wrong address on a warrant, a misunderstanding—result in the terrorizing of innocent people, and more death in what were once nonviolent confrontations with police.
We accept zero-tolerance policies in schools. This results in ridiculous situations, where young children are suspended for pointing gun-shaped fingers at other students or drawing pictures of guns with crayons, and high-school students ...