1.1. Introduction: governance and radar1.1.1. Steering the ship1.1.2. Corporate governance and strategic decision-making1.1.3. The ship’s radar (radio detection and ranging)1.1.4. The organization’s “radar”, a tool for its governability1.2. The organization’s environment and its governance through a “storm”1.2.1. The ship, the ocean, and any danger to be faced1.2.2. The enterprise, its environment, uncertainty, hazards, and opportunities1.2.2.1. Examples of causes of hazard1.2.2.1.1. Competitors1.2.2.1.2. Instability, volatility, turbulence1.2.2.1.3. Lack of visibility1.2.2.2. From the environment to the strategy1.2.2.3. From strategy to the environment1.2.3. Scrutinizing and interpreting the environment1.3. Anticipation (act of looking forward)1.3.1. Anticipating: definition and examples1.3.1.1. Summing up1.3.2. Do not confuse anticipation with forecasting1.3.3. Anticipation and scenario-based prospective: possible complementarity1.3.4. Anticipating odd events, discontinuities, anomalies, etc1.4. Anticipative information: two types1.4.1. Definition1.4.2. Difference between strategic information and day-to-day management information1.4.3. Two types of anticipative information1.4.3.1. Capability information1.4.3.2. Information that may trigger a warning1.5. Weak signals1.5.1. Definition of a weak signal1.5.2. An example of weak signal as the trigger to a warning1.5.3. Should we prefer a “strong” but backward-looking signal, or a “weak” but forward-looking signal?1.5.3.1. Commentary1.5.3.2. Ignored strong signals1.5.4. Conversion, transformation of a weak signal into an early warning signal1.5.5. Should we refer to a “signal” or a “sign”? Intentionality of the sender1.5.6. Weak signals… or decoys, deceptions, and information asymmetry1.5.7. Characteristics of a weak signal: “stealthy information”1.5.7.1. Useful characteristics1.5.7.2. Regrettable characteristics1.5.8. Sources emitting weak signals: examples1.5.8.1. Field sources1.5.8.2. Digital sources1.5.8.3. Weak signals provoked by the receiver himself1.6. Detecting weak signals1.6.1. Individual intelligence (in the Latin sense of the word): a definition1.6.2. Cognitive style of a person1.6.3. Individual cognitive biases1.6.4. Fear1.7. Interpreting, amplifying and exploiting weak signals to support strategic decision making1.7.1. Need for collective intelligence (CI) for interpreting weak signals1.7.2. CM: justification and definition of the process1.7.2.1. Definition1.7.2.2. Deliverables expected from collective creation of meaning1.7.2.3. Thought process carried out during collective creation of meaning1.7.2.3.1. Inductive reasoning1.7.2.3.2. Heuristic reasoning1.7.2.3.3. Lateral thinking1.7.2.3.4. Associative memory1.7.2.3.5. Bounded rationality1.7.3. Definition of CI as the emergence of CCM1.7.4. From CCM to knowledge management1.7.4.1. Discontinuous mode of collective creation of meaning1.7.4.2. The need for mobilization and knowledge management1.8. Puzzle® method for the operationalization of CCM1.8.1. Issue: why the puzzle metaphor?1.8.1.1. A puzzle without a model1.8.1.2. Definition1.8.2. Definition of the Puzzle® method1.8.2.1. Positioning information items in relation to one another1.8.2.2. Constructing potential links among items of information1.8.2.3. Storing successive puzzles for an audit and/or for possible future modeling of the treatment of weak signals1.8.2.4. Avoiding confusion between the graphical representation of the puzzle and the drawing of a mindmap obtained using software1.8.3. Fundamental hypotheses of the Puzzle® method1.8.4. Work group and CI1.9. Global VASIC process for detecting, recognizing and utilizing weak signals1.9.1. Targeting of anticipative scanning and information sources1.9.2. Tracking and individual selection of weak signals1.9.3. Escalating information, collective/centralized selection and storage1.9.4. Dissemination and preparation of information for CCM sessions1.9.5. Animation1.9.6. Measurements: performance indicators of the VASIC process1.10. Conclusion1.10.1. Results on completion of Chapter 1