Applied Concept Mapping

109

© 2011 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

6

Using Concept Maps to Improve

the Practice and Organization

of Intelligence in Canada

Natalia Derbentseva and David R. Mandel

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence production is a vital state function that supports military and

policy decision making (Davis, 2006; Herman, 1996; Jervis, 1991). e

underlying process of intelligence analysis is inherently challenging. It

involves a great deal of uncertainty (Davis, 1992; Heuer, 1999; Lefebvre,

2004) and, with today’s “information tsunami” only gaining strength,

CONTENTS

Introduction ....................................................................................................109

Model Development .......................................................................................112

Workshop Organization ................................................................................114

Workshop Results ...........................................................................................115

Perceived Applications .........................................................................115

System Analysis and Management Tool. ................................116

Analytic Tool ..............................................................................116

Validation Mechanism and Quality Control .........................117

Collaboration Tool to Develop Shared Understanding ........118

Training and Knowledge Transfer...........................................119

Communicative Function ....................................................... 120

Advantages and Drawbacks of Concept Mapping ............................121

Collaborative Map Construction ....................................................... 123

Future Directions ........................................................................................... 126

References ........................................................................................................127

110  •  Applied Concept Mapping

© 2011 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

it is increasingly likely to prompt cognitive overload (Johnson, 2007;

Treverton, 2001; Woods, Patterson, and Roth, 2002).

While the intelligence function goes largely unnoticed by the public eye,

intelligence failures that signicantly impact human lives or international

relations bring it acutely into the spotlight. Intelligence failures, such as

those associated with the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and

misjudgment of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability,

drew considerable public attention to the U.S. intelligence community and

triggered a number of commissions of inquiry tasked with recommend-

ing reformative meas ures (Butler et al., 2004; National Commission on

Terrorism Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Although intelligence misjudgments are inevitable due to the uncer-

tainty of events and inherent low predictability of human behavior (Brady,

1993; Heuer, 1999), the tendency to form poor judgments may be aected

by several factors, including:

• Poor leadership, lack of interorganizational coordination, and infor-

mation sharing (Hulnick, 2008).

• Low quality of available information (Pritchard and Goodman, 2009).

• Misinterpretation of available information due to cognitive biases

and mindsets (Buttereld, 1993; Heuer, 1999).

• e necessity “to rely on fallible assumptions and inconclusive evi-

dence” as a consequence of substantive uncertainty (Davis, 2008).

• “Lack of analytical imagination,” i.e., an inability to generate unlikely

hypotheses, which may subsequently impede proper collection

requirements from being developed (Bruce, 2008).

• Too much emphasis on current reporting and quantity of produc-

tion (Johnston, 2005), organizational culture, and incentive struc-

ture (Davis, 2008; Johnston, 2005).

• Dynamics of the decision maker–analyst relationship that could

result in politicization of intelligence or failures of decision makers

to heed accurate intelligence assessments and failure to dismiss inac-

curate ones (Steinberg, 2008; Treverton, 2008).

Not surprisingly, due to recent intelligence failures, intelligence orga-

nizations in many countries are under signicant pressure to review

and improve their processes in order to overcome the aforementioned

challenges. In an eort to address these issues and explore potential