2Real Consciousness

Daniel C. DennettTufts University

In Consciousness Explained (1991a), I put forward a rather detailed empirical theory of consciousness, together with an analysis of the implications of that theory for traditional philosophical treatments of consciousness. In the critical response to the book, one of the common themes has been that my theory is not a realist theory but rather an eliminativist or verificationist denial, in one way or another, of the very reality of consciousness. Here I draw together a number of those threads, and my responses to them.1

It is clear that your consciousness of a stimulus is not simply a matter of its arrival at some peripheral receptor or transducer; most of the impingements on your end organs ...

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