Counterparty Credit Risk and Credit Value Adjustment: A Continuing Challenge for Global Financial Markets, 2nd Edition

13.1 DVA and Counterparty Risk

13.1.1 The Need for DVA

CVA has traditionally been a charge for counterparty risk that is incorporated in a transaction in favour of the stronger credit quality counterparty. Historically, banks trading with corporate counterparties have charged CVAs linked to the credit quality of the corporate and the exposure in question. A corporate would not have been able to credibly question such a charge since the probability that a bank would default was considered remote (and indeed the credit spreads of banks have traditionally been very tight and the credit ratings very strong). The suggestion that a large bank such as Lehman Brothers would default was, until 2008, an almost laughable concept.

Now let us fast-forward to the credit crisis beginning in 2007. Gradually, the idea of “default-free” counterparties became not credible and credit spreads of the “strong” financial institutions widened dramatically. Consider the following situation.

A corporate client has traded with a top-tier bank for a number of years. The credit ratings and credit spreads of each institution are as follows:

Credit rating	Credit spread
Bank	Aa1/AA+	10–15 bps
Corporate	A3/A–	200–300 bps

The bank will always charge a CVA to the corporate on trades and will be transparent about the calculation; for example, explaining the quantities used to come up with the CVA and also giving benefit due to netting (and possibly collateral) agreements that are in place. The corporate ...