10Scoring rules
In Chapter 2 we studied coherence and explored relations between “acting rationally” and using probability to measure uncertainty about unknown events. De Finetti’s “Dutch Book” theorem guaranteed that, if one wants to avoid a sure loss (that is, be coherent), then probability calculus ought to be used to represent uncertainty. The conclusion was that, regardless of one’s beliefs, it is incoherent not to express such beliefs in the form of some probability distribution. In our discussion, the relationship between the agent’s own knowledge and expertise, empirical evidence, and the probability distribution used to set fair betting odds was left unexplored. In this chapter we will focus on two related questions. The first is how to guarantee that probability assessors reveal their knowledge and expertise about unknowns in their announced probabilities. The second is how to evaluate, after events have occurred, whether their announced probabilities are “good.”
To make our discussion concrete, we will focus on a simple situation, in which assessors have a clear interest in the quality of their announced probabilities. The prototypical example is forecasting. We will talk about weather forecasting, partly because it is intuitive, and partly because meteorologists were among the first to realize the importance of this problem. Weather forecasting is a good example to illustrate these concepts, but clearly not the only application of these ideas. In fact, any time you ...
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