Engineering Ethics

Chapter 3

1978: Ford Pinto Recall

39

THE REPORTED STORY

The New York Times Abstract:

After months of vigorously defending the safety of the fuel systems in its

Pinto automobile, the Ford Motor Company today announced the recall of

1.5 million of the subcompacts for “modifications” of the fuel system aimed at

increasing resistance to leakage and diminishing the risk of fire in the event of

rear-end crashes. (Stuart, 1978)

THE BACK STORY

A

UTOMOBILE SAFETY

When Henry Ford began to market the Model T, the first mass-produced

automobile, in 1908, its design had no specific provisions for safety. Until

1955, safety door locks were not installed in any model, even though doors

opened in 42% of all serious crashes until that time. In general, the public

believed that the primary cause of accidents was improper driving.

The entire safety establishment, which was heavily influenced by the auto

industry, promoted the view that safety meant “safe behavior by drivers”

(Dirksen, 1997).

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40 Engineering Ethics: An Industrial Perspective

The Ford Motor Company attempted to change this viewpoint in 1956,

when it introduced its “Lifeguard Design.” This new design involved equip-

ping cars with a deep-dish steering wheel, padded seatbacks, swing-away

rearview mirrors, safety door latches, safety belts, padded dashboards, and

padded sun visors and rearview mirrors (Dirksen, 1997). The intent of these

features was to minimize the effect of a driver colliding with the inside of his

or her car during a crash. Unfortunately, General Motors (G.M.) Chevrolet’s

emphasis on new design and a more powerful V-8 engine led to more sales

than Ford that year, leading many in the auto industry to conclude that

“safety doesn’t sell.” Ford management responded by deemphasizing safety

and focusing more on style and horsepower (Fielder, 1994).

Ralph Nader challenged this viewpoint in 1965 with the publication of

his book Unsafe At Any Speed. He called attention to the structural defects

in G.M.’s Corvair, which he believed (an investigation by the National

Highway Traffic and Safety Administration proved otherwise) caused the

car to become uncontrollable and overturn at high speeds. He also raised the

question, Who is responsible for injuries and deaths due to auto accidents?

Said Nader, “The prevailing view of traffic safety is much more a political

strategy to defend special interests than it is an empirical program to save

lives and prevent injuries . . . Under existing business values potential safety

advances are subordinated to other investments, priorities, preferences, and

themes designed to maximize profit” (Nader, 1965).

In response, G.M. hired detectives to investigate Nader in hopes of

discrediting him. It later issued Nader a public apology and paid $425,000

to settle a civil action for invasion of privacy. These disclosures caused

great public outrage and put pressure on the U.S. Congress to pass the

Highway Safety Act and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

in 1966. During this time, the annual death rate from auto accidents

approached 50,000. The Highway Safety Act mandated federal regulation

of the automotive industry and led to the creation of an enforcement

agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)

(Cullen, 1994). The Motor Vehicle Safety Act required NHTSA to issue

new safety regulations by January 31, 1967.

Ford management met with NHTSA in 1966 to convince the agency

that auto accidents are caused by “people and highway conditions”

(Dowie, 1994). One result of this meeting was an informal agreement that

cost-benefit analysis could be used by auto manufacturers to determine

auto safety decisions. Cost-benefit analysis is a business tool used to deter-

mine whether the cost of a project justifies the dollar value of benefits that

would be derived. Cost-benefit analysis was first used at Ford by Robert

McNamara, who eventually became Ford president. After McNamara left

Ford to become Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and

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