Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games
Rida Laraki*,†; Sylvain Sori‡ * CNRS in LAMSADE (Université Paris-Dauphine), France† Econimicsonomics Department at Ecole Polytechnique, France‡ Mathematics, CNRS, IMJ-PRG, UMR 7586, Sorbonne Universites, UPMC Univ Paris 06, Univ Paris Diderot, Sorbonne Paris Cite, Paris, France
The survey presents recent results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games and their connections with differential and continuous-time games. The emphasis is made on the following
(1) A general model allows to deal simultaneously with stochastic and informational aspects.
(2) All evaluations of the stage payoffs can be covered in the same framework (and not only the usual Cesàro and Abel means). ...
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