5.4.3 Some existing models of noncooperative coalition formation

In this section, we describe some models of coalition formation and embed these into the real-time setup developed in the previous section. In most cases, these existing models are not real-time theories, and the resulting embedding is perforce somewhat unnatural. That, to us, is a virtue: not only will we be able to describe the positive and useful features of these models, but—to the extent that a real-time description is actually called for in some situations—we will also be able to point out potential inadequacies in the existing literature.

5.4.3.1 The standard bargaining problem

Much of what we do relies on the solution to a standard bargaining problem, due to Ståhl (1977) ...

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