O'Reilly logo

Handbook of Game Theory by Shmuel Zamir, Petyon Young

Stay ahead with the world's most comprehensive technology and business learning platform.

With Safari, you learn the way you learn best. Get unlimited access to videos, live online training, learning paths, books, tutorials, and more.

Start Free Trial

No credit card required

12.7.3 Initial CBR

We begin with the simplest set of epistemic assumptions that take into account the extensive-form nature of the game, but are still close to strategic-form analysis in spirit.

Following Ben-Porath (1997), we consider the assumption that players are (sequentially) rational and initially commonly believe in (sequential) rationality:

RICBRi0=Ri,RICBRik=RICBRik1Bi,ϕ(RICBRik1)fork<0,RICBRi=k0RICBRik.

si580_e  [12.22]

Except for the fact that rationality is interpreted in the sense of Definition 12.24, these epistemic assumptions are analogous to RCBR in simultaneous-moves games, as defined in Eqs. 12.9 and 12.10. Direct restrictions ...

With Safari, you learn the way you learn best. Get unlimited access to videos, live online training, learning paths, books, interactive tutorials, and more.

Start Free Trial

No credit card required