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Managerial Economics and Strategy, 2/e
book

Managerial Economics and Strategy, 2/e

by Jeffrey M. Perloff, James A. Brander
February 2016
Beginner to intermediate content levelBeginner to intermediate
500 pages
33h 40m
English
Pearson
Content preview from Managerial Economics and Strategy, 2/e

Questions

All exercises are available on MyEconLab; =answer [&\*|=|answer&] at the back of this book; =use C[&~bf~|=|~normal~use~norm~&] of calculus may be necessary.

1. Repeated Games

  1. *1.1 Two firms are planning to sell 10 or 20 units of their goods and face the following profit matrix:

    1. What is the Nash equilibrium if both firms make their decisions simultaneously? (Hint: See Chapter 12 .) What strategy does each firm use?

    2. Draw the game tree if Firm 1 can decide first. What is the outcome? Why?

    3. Draw the game tree if Firm 2 can decide first. What is the outcome? Why?

  2. *1.2 In the repeated-game airline example illustrated in Table ...

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Publisher Resources

ISBN: 9780134472553