Game Theoretic Rationality
Each outcome in a negotiation situation may be identified in terms of its utility for each party. In Figure A1-7, for example, party 1's utility function is represented as u1; party 2's utility function is represented as u2. Remember that utility payoffs represent the satisfaction parties derive from particular commodities or outcomes, not the actual monetary outcomes or payoffs themselves. A bargaining situation like that in Figure A1-7 has a feasible set of utility outcomes, or F, defined as the set of all its possible utility outcomes for party 1 and party 2 and by its conflict point, c, where c = (c1, c2). c represents the point at which both parties would prefer not to reach agreement—the reservation points of ...
Become an O’Reilly member and get unlimited access to this title plus top books and audiobooks from O’Reilly and nearly 200 top publishers, thousands of courses curated by job role, 150+ live events each month,
and much more.
Read now
Unlock full access