We’d like to close this chapter on policy formation with a few words about knowledge. In traditional security, derived largely from military intelligence, there is the concept of “need to know.” Information is partitioned, and you are given only as much as you need to do your job. In environments where specific items of information are sensitive or where inferential security is a concern, this policy makes considerable sense. If three pieces of information together can form a damaging conclusion and no one has access to more than two, you can ensure confidentiality.
In a computer operations environment, applying the same need-to-know concept is usually not appropriate. This is especially true if you find yourself basing your security on the fact that something technical is unknown to your attackers. This concept can even hurt your security.
Consider an environment where management decides to keep the manuals away from the users to prevent them from learning about commands and options that might be used to crack the system. Under such circumstances, the managers might believe they have increased their security, but they probably have not. A determined attacker will find the same documentation elsewhere—from other users or from other sites. Extensive amounts of Unix documentation are as close as the nearest bookstore! Management cannot close down all possible avenues for learning about the system.
In the meantime, the local users are likely ...