Process Techniques for Engineering High-Performance Materials

273

10

Development Trials on Large-Scale

Equipment

How do we turn promising prototypes into commercial products? What strategy

should we use for each different project type? How do trials change as development

progresses toward commercialization? Why do development and production organi-

zations view this work differently?

If you can’t describe what you are doing as a process, you don’t know

what you’re doing.

W. Edwards Deming

History’s worst plant trial had been underway for 35seconds during the

early hours of April 26, 1986. Shift leader Alexander Akimov sat in the pro-

cess control room with his hand poised over the emergency stop switch. His

crew was trying desperately to maintain control over an inherently unstable

situation. Akimov was only 80minutes into his shift on the worst day of his

career and had only a few hellish days left to live.

The atmosphere in the control room was tense. The engineer-in-charge,

Anatoly Dyatlov, was determined to complete his experiment, regardless

of the warning signs. Safety interlocks had been bypassed. The plant was

running in uncharted “white spot” territory and was responding abnor-

mally. The run plan was covered with cross-outs and handwritten additions.

Because of unexpected delays, Akimov had not been briefed on the proce-

dures. Under the original schedule, his team should have been overseeing

the plant shutdown, rather than running the trial.

A historic drama was unfolding at Chernobyl Unit 4, a Soviet RBMK-

1000 power plant. This reactor design had a number of aws, which made

Akimov’s job both difcult and dangerous. The system was unstable

when operating at low power levels and would run away in a fatal pos-

itive feedback loop if the cooling water ow was disrupted. This state

secret was concealed from the plant’s operators. The unit was lled to its

limit with radioactive waste, which made the control response sluggish

and erratic.

Ironically, Dyatlov’s risky experiment was to verify a vital safety system

for the plant. He was trying to demonstrate that the steam-turbine genera-

tors could provide temporary electrical power as they spun down during an

emergency shutdown. This transient energy supply was needed for a critical

274 Process Techniques for Engineering High-Performance Materials

30–40 seconds until the backup generators kicked in. The central power

authority required that this operation be veried with a full-scale plant test.

Management bonuses were at stake.

In the run-up to the brief test, the operators needed to stabilize the reac-

tor at half the normal power level. Control rods were lowered into the

core to absorb neutrons, slowing the chain reaction. However, a strange

situation developed, which was beyond Akimov’s experience. The output

power plunged to 5% of nominal levels. Inside the core, iodine and xenon

135 gas were collecting around the fuel rods. These reaction by-products

absorb the neutrons, which sustain the chain reaction.

In this situation, the reactor should have been shut down for 24hours to

allow the iodine and xenon to disperse. However, Dyatlov was under pres-

sure to complete the experiment and was determined to move forward. On

his authority, more and more control rods were extracted to coax the power

output up to the required levels.

Without moderators, the nuclear chain reaction gradually climbed out of

the “iodine well” that was choking it. The reactor’s thermal output increased

slowly, but it was still below the planned levels. Impatiently, Dyatlov ordered