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5

Assessing the Risk and Threat

of Hostile Organizations

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

George Santayana

Philosopher (1905)

On the evening of Tuesday, June 16, 2009, James Amburn, an American

banker and nancial advisor, was kidnapped from his home in Speyer,

Germany. The adversaries in this case can perhaps only be described as

history’s most usual crew of kidnappers to ever target another individual.

Amburn arrived at his residence to nd four men, all retirees with an age

range of between 57 and 80 years of age. They had traveled from their

homes in Bavaria, a distance of some 280 miles. Amburn had been the

advisor for these men and when the economy turned downward, they

lost approximately $5 million in investments in the U.S. real estate market.

During the discussion that followed their arrival at Amburn’s home,

one of the men mentioned to another to get the green folder from the car.

Unbeknownst to Amburn, this was the signal to start the kidnap. Amburn

was quickly overpowered and disabled by having his hands, knees, and

feet bound with duct tape. He was then put into a wooden box that the

men had previous constructed. The box with Amburn inside was placed

into the trunk of the kidnappers’ Audi 8 sedan and driven back to one of

the men’s homes near the Austrian border. Amburn was held prisoner for

four days in a basement cell until his rescue by law enforcement. All four

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elderly men, along with their elderly wives, were arrested and ultimately

convicted of the crime.

1

This amazing story provides denitive proof that one can never know

with any certainty when or if he or she may be a target for organized

violence. This extends to law enforcement and security agencies, where

determining the presence and level of risk an individual may face can

be difcult to assess, even when the potential threat source and target

are known. When neither is known, conducting assessments requires

a different set of analytical processes, a little skill, resources, and even

luck. In the years following the September 11 attacks in New York City

and Washington, D.C., much has been said about “connecting the dots”

by government intelligence agencies, and how there were failures and

missed opportunities. Conducting a threat assessment against an adver-

sary can be extremely difcult, let alone against an unknown hostile

group. Rather than connecting the dots, it is more akin to putting together

a jigsaw puzzle without having all the pieces, not knowing if you can nd

all the pieces, or how many pieces there are in the rst place, and nally

having no idea what the nished picture looks like.

Much of the current literature dealing with threat assessments is from

the perspective that the “threatening” party is known to the victim and/

or authorities (including corporate security). These cases typically fall

into categories of stalking, mental illness, domestic violence, and antiso-

cial subjects. However, in examining organized targeted killings and kid-

nappings perpetrated against government representatives and corporate

executives over the past 60 years, many were attacked without ever receiv-

ing a threat. Alternatively, if threats were received, the individuals issuing

the threat never identied themselves and, more importantly, the hostile

parties tasked with conducting the attack were not known or believed to

have a direct link to the victim.

Organized targeted attacks are by their nature difcult to foresee.

The individuals in control of these groups are often dedicated and secre-

tive. This makes conrming the threat they represent and, more impor-

tantly, preempting them exceedingly difcult. The type of organization

the threat stems from also presents assessment problems. Terrorist orga-

nizations tend to have a longer time horizon in which to strike. Further,

should a particular target be deemed too difcult to reach, they can easily

switch to another and still accomplish their political goal.

Conversely, criminal groups tend to have a much more constricted

time frame in which to strike. They also tend to focus on a specic indi-

vidual causing them problems. However, if the target is determined to