Public Finance, 2nd Edition

how the eYciency and equity norms described in Chapter 1 are incorporated

into the formal model.

REFERENCES

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Government Printing OYce, Washington D.C., 2001, Part Five: Historical Tables,

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and Public AVairs, Vol. 4, 1974±75.

1. INTRODUCTION TO NORMATIVE PUBLIC SECTOR THEORY 31

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