equal zero for some i or even most i. All that is required for the existence of a
consumption externality is that one person's utility be a function of one other
person's consumption (supply) of something.
THE WORST OF ALL WORLDSÐALL GOODS (FACTORS) ARE
PURE PUBLIC GOODS (FACTORS)
In the worst of all worlds, all goods (factors) are pure public goods (factors).
2
For policy purposes, this is really a horrendous situation as the government
can hardly interpret what the proper decision rules mean let alone have any
hope of implementing them. The government's problem is
max
X
ik
WU
h
X
ik
s:t: F
P
H
i1
X
ik
0
with the understanding that each utility function U
h
( ) contains all NH
elements, X
ik
i 1, ...,H;k 1, ...,N.
The corresponding Lagrangian is
max
X
ik
L WU
h
X
ik
lF
P
H
i1
X
ik
Before proceeding, notice how deceptively similar this problem is to the
problem of social welfare maximization when there are only pure private
goods. In our notation, the pure private goods case is represented as:
max
X
hk
WU
h
X
hk
s:t: F
P
H
h1
X
hk
0
In each case, maximization occurs with respect to HN goods and factors, the
N goods and factors consumed and supplied by each of H people. The
diVerence is that in the worst of all worlds all HN variables appear in each
utility function, whereas in the pure private goods (factors) world only N
variables appear in each utility function. This diVerence matters, because the
policy implications are enormously diVerent. In the latter case, the competi-
tive market can achieve full pareto optimality. In the former case, the market
cannot be expected to achieve eYciency, and the government is virtually
powerless to act in an optimal manner. The problems for the government
in the pure public goods case are self-evident upon examination of the
2
Ng provides an alternative model of this worst of all worlds in Y-K Ng, ``The Paradox of
Universal Externalities,'' Journal of Economic Theory, April 1975.
6. CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES 157
Wrst-order conditions for social welfare maximization, both the interpersonal
equity conditions and the pareto-optimal conditions.
Interpersonal Equity Conditions
Recall that the interpersonal equity conditions are obtained by comparing
the Wrst-order conditions for any one good (factor) consumed (supplied) by
any two people, say X
j1
and X
i1
. The Wrst-order conditions are
X
j1
:
P
H
h1
qW
qU
h
qU
h
X
j1
lF
1
(6:4)
X
i1
:
P
H
h1
qW
qU
h
qU
h
X
i1
lF
1
(6:5)
From conditions (6.4) and (6.5),
P
H
h1
qW
qU
h
qU
h
X
i1
lF
1
all i 1, ...,H (6:6)
The interpretation of the interpersonal equity conditions is identical to that
of the standard model in Chapter 2, which contained only pure private goods:
The government should redistribute good 1, lump sum, until social welfare is
equalized on the margin across all individuals. This task, diYcult enough
with pure private goods, is now hopelessly complex, however. When the
government gives (takes) an extra unit of good (factor) 1 to (from) person i,
it must know how all people react to that transfer (tax) on the margin, not just
how person i's utility is aVected, and similarly for units transferred to or from
any other person. This is clearly an impossible task, one the government
could not even hope to approximate.
Pareto-Optimal Conditions
The pareto-optimal conditions also diVer considerably from their counter-
part in a world of pure private goods, both in form and interpretation. Recall
that the pareto-optimal conditions are obtained from the Wrst-order condi-
tions of any two goods consumed (factors supplied) by any one person, say
X
ik
and X
i1
. The Wrst-order conditions are
X
ik
:
P
H
h1
qW
qU
h
qU
h
X
ik
lF
k
(6:7)
X
il
:
P
H
h1
qW
qU
h
qU
h
X
il
lF
1
(6:8)
Dividing Eq. (6.7) by (6.8) yields:
158 THE WORST OF ALL WORLDSÐALL GOODS (FACTORS) ARE PURE PUBLIC GOODS
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