You’re in an environment in which you’d like to use a hash function, but you would prefer to use one based on a block cipher. This might be because you have only a block cipher available, or because you would like to minimize security assumptions in your system.
There are several good algorithms for doing this. We present one, Davies-Meyer, where the digest size is the same as the block length of the underlying cipher. With 64-bit block ciphers, Davies-Meyer does not offer sufficient security unless you add a nonce, in which case it is barely sufficient. Even with AES-128, without a nonce, Davies-Meyer is somewhat liberal when you consider birthday attacks.
Unfortunately, there is only one well-known scheme worth using for converting a block cipher into a hash function that outputs twice the block length (MDC-2), and it is patented at the time of this writing. However, those patent issues will go away by August 28, 2004. MDC-2 is covered in Recipe 6.16.
Note that such constructs assume that block ciphers resist related-key attacks. See Recipe 6.3 for a general comparison of such constructs compared to dedicated constructs like SHA1.
Hash functions do not provide security in and of themselves! If you need to perform message integrity checking, use a MAC instead.
The Davies-Meyer hash function uses the message to hash as key material for the block cipher. The input is padded, strengthened, and broken ...