Heinrich H. Nax, Ryan O. Murphy, and Dirk Helbing
Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation
Abstract: John F Nash (1950) proposed dynamics for repeated interactions according to which agents myopically play individual best-responses against their observations of other agents’ past play. Such dynamics converge to Nash equilibria. Without suitable mechanisms, this means that best-response dynamics can lead to low levels of cooperative behavior and thus to inefficient outcomes in social dilemma games. Here, we discuss the theoretical predictions of these dynamics in a variety of social dilemmas and assess these in light of behavioral evidence. We particularly focus on “meritocratic matching”, a class of mechanisms that leads to both ...
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