The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory
by AAron Walters, Jamie Levy, Andrew Case, Michael Hale Ligh
Chapter 25 Userland Rootkits
When adversaries design rootkits, one of the first decisions that they must make is whether the rootkit will operate in userland (process memory) or kernel mode. Kernel mode rootkits offer the most power, such as Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) capabilities, direct interaction with hardware devices, and the capability to perform certain privileged operations. However, many common rootkit tasks such as hiding processes, logging keystrokes, and snooping on network activity can all be accomplished in userland. Furthermore, userland rootkits are more portable, whereas the kernel mode counterparts are difficult to maintain due to the rapidly changing Linux kernel. Another issue is that a number of system administration tools and Host Intrusion Prevention Systems (HIPS) perform kernel mode rootkit detection. On the other hand, userland rootkit detection has so far received only minor attention, which gives the attacker greater freedom over what techniques can be used and might prolong their access to the target system.
In previous chapters, you learned how to classify userland process activity based on network sockets and connections, open files handles, and user/group contexts. The techniques discussed in this chapter are used solely for malicious purposes, and are used to intercept and modify data as well as frustrate the efforts of investigators through anti-forensics. Specifically, you will see the wide range of capabilities that userland ...