The Database Hacker's Handbook: Defending Database Servers
by David Litchfield, Chris Anley, John Heasman, Bill Grindlay
Network-Based Attacks Against PostgreSQL
Before the database can be attacked, a connection must be established via a startup message containing a username. This must cause at least a partial match in the pg_hba.conf, or else the postmaster will respond with an ErrorResponse and the connection will be dropped. If a database name is not specified, it defaults to the username. Attackers may have to resort to guesswork if they have little knowledge of the environment. The error message returned to the attacker when no match has been made in the pg_hba.conf file does not reveal whether the username was correct but the database was not (and vice versa), nor whether there is a specific host from which the username-database name pair is accepted.
The techniques described in the following sections can be performed only if the attacker is on the same network segment as either the client or the server — this implies the attacker has physical access to the network, or has already compromised a system on the same segment. This is not an unreasonable assumption, because it is rare that an administrator will allow remote access to their database from an untrusted network such as the Internet, thus the attacker will first look to compromise other systems that have Internet-facing services such as a web server or FTP server.
Network Sniffing
If SSL is not enabled, PostgreSQL transactions will appear in clear text. The packet sniffer Ethereal contains a basic PostgreSQL protocol dissector that displays ...
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