This is Environmental Ethics: An Introduction

3 TWO MORE EXAMPLES OF MORAL EXTENSIONISM: CHRISTOPHER STONE, HOLMES ROLSTON III, AND THEIR CRITICS

3.1 The Rights of Trees: The “Moral Standing” Extensionism of Christopher Stone

3.1.1 Moral Extensionism, the Concept of “Wilderness,” and Human Chauvinism

It might seem at this point that we’ve strayed a bit from our original mission of drafting an environmental ethic. We’ve been focused on the question to what all can we extend moral principles like utility or the categorical imperative, and this compels us to consider capacities like consciousness, sentience, and intellectual wherewithal in order to gain a firm foothold on just how far moral extensionism can go. It might seem that we’ve not said much about the environment, at least directly, at all. But we’re right on course. We’ve simply made it a point not to prejudice the question to what the possible extension of a moral principle might rightly apply. We’ve sought to avoid exclusions that would seem arbitrary—that would be arbitrary. Adopting a kind of agnosticism about what that range of inclusion might be will help us avoid treating the environment as mere background for human projects. We’ve already enlivened our discussion of the planet’s ecosystems by introducing an array of human and nonhuman beings, as well as a range of capacities, interactions, and limitations. By refusing to adopt a rigid distinction between ecosystems and the countless species, cultures, and societies that inhabit their deserts, plains, and ...