Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security, 4 Volume Set

VULNERABILITY OF THE DOMESTIC FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN

PETER CHALK

RAND, Santa Monica, California

1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the United States has moved to increase its ability to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist threats and incidents. Much of this focus, which has involved considerable financial outlays, has aimed at upgrading public infrastructure through the development of vulnerability threat analyses designed to maximize both antiterrorist contingencies and consequence management modalities. Although many gaps remain, investments in preparedness, training, and response have helped with the development of at least nascent homeland incident command structures that have incrementally begun to span the ambit of potential terrorist attacks, from conventional bombings to more “exotic” biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear incidents.

Agriculture and food production have received comparatively little attention in this regard, however. In terms of accurate threat assessments and consequence management procedures, these related sectors exist somewhat as latecomers to the growing emphasis that has been given to critical infrastructure protection (CIP) in this country. Indeed at the time of writing, total funding for protecting the nation's food supply stood at only $2.6 billion, a mere 2% of the US$130.7 billion in Congressional allocations earmarked for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in Financial Year (FY) 2006.¹

This article expands the debate ...