Index
A
Absolute budget, 42
Absolutely continuous function, 64, 83, 205
Actual bidders, 32–34
Actual value, 129
Adaptively separable valuations, 264
Additive values, 231
Affiliated random variables, 285–286
component-wise maxima/minima for,
286f
conditional expectations of, 288
two, 286–287
Affiliation, 87, 95–96
exclusion principle and, 122–125
implications of, 88
lack of, 103
problems for, 102–103
Aggregate demand function, 175–176, 175f
AGV mechanism. See Arrow-d’ Aspremont-
Gérard-Varet mechanism
All-inclusive cartel, 167
Allocation, 227, 240
Allocation problem
simplicity of, 235
VCG mechanism and, 234
Allocation rule, 61, 204
All-pay auction, 34–35
ranking, 111
revenue equivalence principle and, 29–30
Anonymity, 6
Arrow-d’ Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanism
(AGV mechanism), ...