Chapter 13. The Sociotechnical Systems
Software design is an exercise in human relationships.
Kent Beck, Tidy First? (O’Reilly)
In 1979, a reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, experienced a partial meltdown. One of the factors contributing to the incident was that alarms coming from the monitoring systems were confusing, resulting in the human operators not taking action that could have prevented the issue from escalating.
In 1986, a failure in the solid rocket boosters of the Challenger space shuttle caused the craft to fail shortly after launch, killing all seven crew members. It was later determined that the warning signs had been there for all to see: previous launches of the shuttle had shown damage to the O-ring system, something that wasn’t supposed to happen. Despite it being clear that no amount of damage to this component was acceptable, launches continued. Nothing bad had happened when this damage was seen before, so surely the launches could continue?
Humans were critical to these incidents playing out the way they did. In the case of Three Mile Island, the alarm systems left the operators confused and unable to carry out the right mitigating behavior. In the case of Challenger, what occurred became known as “the normalization of deviance.”1 Despite the system behaving in a way that deviated from the norm, because nothing bad happened initially, NASA engineers and managers were conditioned to ignore the preceding deviant ...
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