Components and Security
Systems that are dynamically composed from components have unique security requirements. Because the individual components of an application often come from disparate organizations, it is likely that different aspects of the application may warrant different degrees of trust. For example, components from trusted organizations may need access to private information or critical resources that one normally would need to protect from malicious code. Unfortunately, the classic principal-based security model of Windows NT and UNIX ignores where the code came from and focuses only on who is running the code. For classic 1980s-era programs built before the widespread advent of components, this model made sense. However, for a ...
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