Preface
Back in 2017 we began asking AI experts a lot of questions about the vulnerabilities of artificial intelligence, and rather than responding with answers, these individuals only raised more questions and concerns. We were told that there were no methods or utilities protecting most AI from tampering by a bad or sloppy actor. Worse yet, there was no standard method of checking whether algorithms had been tampered with. Furthermore, as with all other programming, the methods of positively identifying AI developers and system administrators were inconsistent and unreliable, with no global standards for doing so. Methods of universally identifying machines and intelligent agents were nonexistent. Existing methods of proving identity, such as a name and password associated with a code repository, could be easily spoofed—or changed after malicious access—without detection.
There was no way to decide how decisions would be made in the future, or who would be authorized to make those decisions. No way to determine a chain of custody, or to determine who authorized a change in a hierarchy. The identities of the people who worked on a model were vague and untraceable, and worse yet, there was no way to know that any work had been done, or to prove who had authorized it. There was no way for an AI system to shut itself down due to ethics concerns, such as if a money-making stakeholder like a group of shareholders refused to consent to turn it off when it diverged from its original ...
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