6.1. Xinjiang region: an explosive context6.1.1. Ethnic tensions, extremism, separatism, terrorism and violence in Xinjiang6.1.2. Xinjiang: a strategic region6.2. Riots, July 20096.2.1. Chronology of facts6.2.2. Reasons for the riots6.2.3. The riots faced with international public opinion6.3. Impacts on Chinese cyberspace: hacktivism and site defacing6.3.1. The Internet in Xinjiang: a region dependent on information systems?6.3.2. Website defacement in a crisis context6.3.3. Defining the dynamics of the relationship between “political events” and “site defacement”6.3.3.1. Defacements on the .cn domain6.3.3.2. Defacements on .hk domains6.3.3.3. Defacements on the .tw domain6.3.3.4. Defacements on the .mo domain6.3.3.5. Defacements on the .tr domain6.3.3.6. Defacements on the .jp domain6.3.3.7. Defacements on the .au domain6.3.3.8. Involved hacktivists6.3.3.9. Content of the claims6.4. Managing the “cyberspace” risk by the Chinese authorities6.4.1. Inaccessible sites6.4.2. Cutting off telephone communications6.4.3. The risks of cyberspace6.4.4. Dealing with the media and information content6.4.5. After the incidents: communication, reaction, control, legislation6.5. Chinese information warfare through the Xinjiang crisis6.5.1. Xinjiang, land of information warfare6.5.2. Chinese information warfare in the prism of Xinjiang management crisis approaches6.5.2.1. Speed and reactivity6.5.2.2. The public national opinion as a sensitive system6.5.2.3. Cyberspace permeability: ultimate control impossible?6.6. Conclusion6.7. Bibliography