The WorldatWork Handbook of Compensation, Benefits & Total Rewards: A Comprehensive Guide for HR Professionals

Appendix . Notes

Chapter 12

1.	Jerome A. Colletti and Stockton Colt, “Identifying a Complex Sales Environment: Results of a Special Member Survey,” workspan, April 2004.
2.	Paul W. Mulvey, Gerald E. Ledford, Jr., and Peter V. LeBlanc. “Rewards of Work: How They Drive Performance, Retention and Satisfaction.” WorldatWork Journal, Third Quarter 2000.

Chapter 13

1.	An alternative view is that executives, who possess inside information, introduce/revise these plans when they believe the corporation is undervalued. Thus, the increased price reaction is a response to the information released, rather than the initiation/revision of the plan itself.
2.	While not a major risk, executive theft or malfeasance does happen, for example, Tyco International (see Maremont and Cohen [2002] for details). Another example is the currently unfolding scandal on the backdating of options.
3.	For an example of these problems in less-developed nations, see Leggett (2000).
4.	One reason the board cannot review every decision is the limited amount of time they have to spend on corporate matters, especially if the corporation is not their primary employer. For example, Silverman (2000b) reports that directors work an average of 173 hours annually.
5.	The decrease in the use of stock options prior to the date for expensing mandated under SFAS 123(revised) can be explained by the fact that mandatory expensing was widely anticipated.
6.	Bebchuk and Fried (2004b) refer to pensions as stealth compensation.
7.	To elaborate, as risk-averse ...