A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology

Toward a Theory of Justified Deterrence

For a considered moral judgment on the possession of and deterrence with nuclear weapons, an ethical theory is needed that can catch the paradoxes that “just war” criteria cannot catch. Such a theory of justified deterrence has parallels and differences with “just war” tradition. A parallel is the distinction between a ius ad dissuasionem (the right to initiate a situation of deterrence) and a ius in dissuasione (rights and duties in a situation of deterrence). Possible criteria:

 

ius ad dissuasionem

Only a legitimate authority may carry out a policy of deterrence.

Deterrence should be aimed only at preventing military aggression by other states or non-state actors.

ius in dissuasione

The strategy and means of deterrence must be such that the effect of the threat of deterrence is maximal (principle of effectiveness).

The strategy and means of deterrence must be such that after a possible failure of deterrence the level of violence is minimal or at least proportionate to the goals of the war to be fought (principle of external proportionality).

Quantitatively and qualitatively the means of deterrence have to be minimal or at least proportionate to the goals of deterrence (principle of internal proportionality).

In any threat of deterrence a distinction should be made between military and non-military targets. Civilians may not become the target of a threat (principle of discrimination).

The threat of deterrence may not be misleading or ambiguous. ...