Windows NT/2000 in the Perimeter Network
Features like discretionary access control, security auditing, and memory protection place the Windows NT core operating system on par (or better) with many Unix systems in terms of local host security. So why do many people claim that Windows is less secure than Unix?
The problem is not really Windows itself; rather it’s the services and applications built on top of the operating system that are the weakest links.
The following sections describe some fundamental principles of secure system design, as well as examine how some of Windows NT/2000’s services and applications stack up to these principles.
Least Privilege
A very important principle is that of least privilege. The least privilege philosophy dictates that an application should be designed to run only with the privilege level it needs to execute properly—and no more.
Consider the following question: what privilege level do you need to grant to a web server application? The simplified answer is that the application needs the right to read the data files it serves. Now, take a look at the Internet Information Server’s (IIS) WWW service. By design, it has to run as Local System, the highest privilege level in Windows. IIS does run the actual worker threads with lower rights, but if an attacker manages to break IIS before the security context switch is made, he’ll be able to do anything, including deleting filesystems, starting up a back door,[17] and so on—you get the idea!
Microsoft ...
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