Chapter 23. Defending Against CSRF Attacks
In Part II we built Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks that took advantage of a user’s authenticated session in order to make requests on their behalf. We built CSRF attacks with <a></a>
links, via <img></img>
tags, and even via HTTP POST using web forms. We saw how effective and dangerous CSRF-style attacks are against an application, because they function at both an elevated privilege level and often are undetectable by the authenticated user.
In this chapter, we will learn how to defend our codebase against such attacks, and mitigate the probability that our users will be put at risk for any type of attack that targets their authenticated session.
Header Verification
Remember the CSRF attacks we built using <a></a>
links? In that discussion, the links were distributed via email or another website entirely separate from the target.
Because the origin of many CSRF requests is separate from your web application, we can mitigate the risk of CSRF attacks by checking the origin of the request. In the world of HTTP, there are two headers we are interested in when checking the origin of a request: referer
and origin
. These headers are important because they cannot be modified programmatically with JavaScript in all major browsers. As such, a properly implemented browser’s referer
or origin
header has a low chance of being spoofed.
- Origin header
-
The
origin
header is only sent on HTTP POST requests. It is a simple header that indicates ...
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