
26 Advances in Mobile Cloud Computing Systems
obtain it as concave except most N nondifferentiable points by analo-
gizing as follows:
∂U
m
(y)
∂y
=(1−αx
∗
r
)
K
k=1
W
2
p
m
h
2
m
(1 −μ
k
x
r
B
rk
)
(ln2)
2
y
2
I
m
(y)(p
m
h
2
m
+ I
m
(y))λ
k
−β
K
k=1
g
2
km
σ
2
k
h
2
k
. (1.21)
Based on Equation 1.21, we know
∂
2
U
m
(y)
∂y
2
is shown as Equation 1.22.
∂
2
U
m
(y)
∂y
2
= −(1 −αx
∗
r
)
K
k=1
W
2
p
m
h
2
m
(1 −μ
k
x
r
B
rk
)
(ln2)
2
λ
k
y
3
(p
m
h
2
m
I
m
+ I
2
m
)
2
×
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
p
m
h
2
m
I
m
+(p
m
h
2
m
+2I
m
)
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
σ
2
m
−
K
k=1
g
2
km
σ
2
k
h
2
k
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
< 0.
(1.22)
Therefore, U
m
(y) is a concave function. And this noncooperative inter-
ference price game is a concave game. According to the formulation
Equation 1.19, this game exists at least one Nash equilibrium.
Then, from ...