book

Handbook of Media Economics, vol 1A

Name: Handbook of Media Economics, vol 1A
ISBN: 9780444627247

by Simon P. Anderson, Joel Waldfogel, David Stromberg

January 2016

Beginner

562 pages

21h 17m

English

North Holland

Read now

Unlock full access

Front Cover
Handbook of Media Economics
Copyright
Introduction to the Series
Contents (1/2)
Contents (2/2)
Introduction
Contributors
Acknowledgment
Dedication

Part I: Media Market Structure and Performance
Chapter 1: Preference Externalities in Media Markets
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Fixed Costs and Heterogeneous Preferences
1.2.1. Fixed Costs1.2.2. Preference Heterogeneity1.2.3. Willingness to Consume Second-Choice Products1.2.4. Advertiser Finance
1.2.5. Change in Costs over Time
1.3. Theory (1/4)1.3.1. Classic Models1.3.1.1. Preference Externalities with Spectrum Constraints: Steiner and Beebe Models1.3.1.2. The Tyranny of the Yuppies1.3.1.3. Lowest Common Denominator
1.3. Theory (2/4)
1.3.2. Spatial Models1.3.2.1. Negative Preference Externalities Under Monopoly1.3.2.2. Preference Externalities Under Duopoly
1.3. Theory (3/4)
1.3.3. Market Size and Equilibrium Media Diversity1.3.4. Optimum Media Diversity1.3.5. Cross-Group Externalities1.3.6. Variety
1.3. Theory (4/4)
1.3.7. Multiple Stations
1.4. Empirical Results: Facts Relevant to Predictions from Theory (1/2)
1.4.1. The Own-Group Preference Externality1.4.1.1. Market Size and Entry1.4.1.2. Market Size and Variety1.4.1.3. Market Size and Quality1.4.1.4. Market Size and Consumption1.4.2. Preference Externalities with Multiple Consumer Types1.4.2.1. Preference Externalities in Markets with Few Products
1.4. Empirical Results: Facts Relevant to Predictions from Theory (2/2)
1.4.2.2. Preference Externalities with Heterogeneous Consumers in Markets with Many Products1.4.3. Efficient Entry and Preference Externalities
1.5. Technological Change, Fixed Costs, and Preference Externalities
Acknowledgments
References
Chapter 2: The Advertising-Financed Business Model in Two-Sided Media Markets
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Cast of Characters
2.2.1. Consumers2.2.2. Advertisers
2.2.3. Media Platforms
2.2.4. Other Players2.3. Equilibrium Analysis of Single-Homing Viewers/Readers/Listeners/Surfers (1/4)2.3.1. The Ad Revenue/Subscription Revenue Balance
2.3. Equilibrium Analysis of Single-Homing Viewers/Readers/Listeners/Surfers (2/4)
2.3.2. Representative Consumer Models2.3.3. Competitive Bottlenecks
2.3. Equilibrium Analysis of Single-Homing Viewers/Readers/Listeners/Surfers (3/4)
2.3.4. See-Saw Effects in Media Markets2.3.5. Heterogeneous Ad-Nuisance Costs, Price Discrimination, and TiVo2.3.6. Market Failures in Advertising Finance2.3.7. Alternative Equilibrium Concepts: Price Versus Quantity
2.3. Equilibrium Analysis of Single-Homing Viewers/Readers/Listeners/Surfers (4/4)
2.3.8. Consumer Information2.3.9. Nonlinear Tariffs and Insulated Equilibrium
2.4. Multi-Homing Viewers/Readers (1/3)
2.4.1. MHCs and Incremental Pricing of Ads2.4.1.1. Endogenous Viewer Choices
2.4. Multi-Homing Viewers/Readers (2/3)
2.4.2. MHC Demand with Observed Ad Levels2.4.3. MHCs and Heterogeneous Advertisers
2.4. Multi-Homing Viewers/Readers (3/3)
2.4.4. Information Congestion and MHCs2.4.5. Take-Aways and Ways Forward
2.5. Equilibrium Genre Choices (1/2)
2.5. Equilibrium Genre Choices (2/2)
2.5.1. Free-Entry Analysis
2.6. Further Directions
Acknowledgments
References
chapter 3: Empirical Modeling for Economics of the Media: Consumer and Advertiser Demand, Firm Supply and Firm Entry Model ...
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Audience Demand (1/3)
3.2.1. Introduction3.2.2. Classic Discrete Choice with Observed and Unobserved Product Characteristics
3.2. Audience Demand (2/3)
3.2.3. Identification of Demand Parameters3.2.4. Example of a Single-Parameter Nested Logit3.2.5. Further Examples of Audience Demand
3.2. Audience Demand (3/3)
3.3. Advertiser Demand
3.4. The Supply Side: Choice of Prices, Ad Quantity, and Other Continuous Characteristics (1/2)
3.4. The Supply Side: Choice of Prices, Ad Quantity, and Other Continuous Characteristics (2/2)
3.5. The Supply Side: Positioning and Entry
3.5.1. Entry Models with Differentiation
3.6. Future Challenges
References
Chapter 4: Advertising in Markets
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Search and Advertising (1/4)
4.2.1. Stigler's Question4.2.2. Diamond's Question4.2.3. Price Advertising and Price Dispersion
4.2. Search and Advertising (2/4)
4.2.4. Too Much or Too Little Advertising?
4.2. Search and Advertising (3/4)
4.2.5. Price Advertising with Product Differentiation
4.2. Search and Advertising (4/4)
4.2.6. Concluding Remarks
4.3. Product Advertising (1/5)
4.3.1. Nelson's Question4.3.2. Empirical Evidence on Advertising Content4.3.3. Match Advertising4.3.3.1. Direct Information About Experience Goods
4.3. Product Advertising (2/5)
4.3.3.2. Search Goods and Advertising Content
4.3. Product Advertising (3/5)
4.3.4. Advertising of Product Attributes4.3.4.1. Unraveling of Quality Information4.3.4.2. Disclosure of Horizontal Match Attributes
4.3. Product Advertising (4/5)
4.3.4.3. Competition and Disclosure of Product Attributes4.3.5. Misleading Advertising4.3.5.1. Cheap Talk
4.3. Product Advertising (5/5)
4.3.5.2. Imperfect Enforcement of Laws on Misleading Advertisements4.3.6. Concluding Remarks
4.4. Advertising as a Signal (1/2)
4.4.1. Nelson Again4.4.2. Quality Signaling and Money Burning4.4.2.1. Static Quality Signaling
4.4. Advertising as a Signal (2/2)
4.4.2.2. Repeat Purchase and Money Burning4.4.3. Advertising and Coordination4.4.4. Concluding Remarks
4.5. Advertising Technology (1/2)
4.5.1. Advertising Costs4.5.1.1. Advertising Costs and Reach4.5.1.2. Disclosure Costs4.5.2. Targeted Advertising
4.5. Advertising Technology (2/2)
4.5.3. Information Congestion4.5.4. Concluding Remarks
4.6. Advertising that Might Not Inform (1/3)
4.6.1. Too Much or Too Little Advertising: A Broader Perspective
4.6. Advertising that Might Not Inform (2/3)
4.6.2. Consumer Naivety
4.6. Advertising that Might Not Inform (3/3)
4.6.3. Advertising and Goodwill4.6.4. Concluding Remarks
4.7. Closing Comments
Acknowledgments
References
Chapter 5: Recent Developments in Mass Media: Digitization and Multitasking
5.1. Recent Trends in Mass Media Consumption (1/2)
5.1.1. Digitization
5.1. Recent Trends in Mass Media Consumption (2/2)
5.1.2. Screen Proliferation
5.2. Effects of Digitization
5.2.1. Consumer Control over Advertising Exposure5.2.2. Increased Targeting of Advertising5.2.3. New Media Business Models5.2.4. Media Market Outcomes
5.3. Effects of Media Multitasking
5.3.1. Media Complementarities5.3.2. Competition for Attention
5.4. Discussion
Acknowledgments
References
Chapter 6: Merger Policy and Regulation in Media Industries
6.1. Introduction
6.2. Price and Quantity Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets (1/2)
6.2.1. Backdrop: Price and Quantity Effects of Mergers in One-Sided Markets6.2.2. Two-Sided Markets and Single-Homing Consumers6.2.3. Two-Sided Markets and Multi-Homing Consumers
6.2. Price and Quantity Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets (2/2)
6.2.4. Effects of Semi-Collusion Through Joint Operating Agreements
6.3. Mergers and Platforms Choice of Genres (1/2)
6.3.1. Maximum Versus Minimum Differentiation6.3.2. Steiner (1952): Mergers May Reduce Duplication of Genres6.3.3. Consumers Have Second Preferences6.3.4. Advertising Effect Differs Between Genres6.3.5. Dual Source of Financing: Charging Both Users and Advertisers6.3.6. Imperfect Competition in the Product Market
6.3. Mergers and Platforms Choice of Genres (2/2)
6.3.7. Multi-Homing Consumers: Competition for Advertisers6.3.8. Limits on Ownership Concentration and Media Bias6.3.9. Empirical Evidence
6.4. Merger Control in Media Markets (1/3)
6.4.1. The Method Used by Antitrust Authorities6.4.1.1. The Traditional Approach6.4.1.2. An Extension to a Two-Sided Market
6.4. Merger Control in Media Markets (2/3)
6.4.2. The Possible Price Effect of Media Mergers6.4.2.1. Merger Control: Some Examples6.4.2.1.1. A One-Sided Market Approach6.4.2.1.2. A Two-Sided Market Approach
6.4. Merger Control in Media Markets (3/3)
6.4.2.2. Empirical Studies6.4.3. The Possible Non-Price Effect of Media Mergers
6.5. Concluding Remarks
Acknowledgments
References
Part II: Sectors
Chapter 7: The Economics of Television and Online Video Markets
7.1. Introduction
7.2. The Television Industry (1/5)
7.2.1. The Types of Television7.2.1.1. Broadcast (Free) Television7.2.1.1.1. Public Service Broadcasters
7.2. The Television Industry (2/5)
7.2.1.2. Pay Television7.2.1.2.1. Pay TV Distribution7.2.1.2.2. Pay TV Program Production (Channels, Networks)
7.2. The Television Industry (3/5)
7.2.1.3. Broadcast (Pay) Television: DTT
7.2. The Television Industry (4/5)
7.2.2. Cross-Platform Television Statistics
7.2. The Television Industry (5/5)
7.3. A Simple Model of the Television Market (1/2)
7.3.1. The Baseline Model7.3.1.1. Baseline Results7.3.1.2. Oligopoly
7.3. A Simple Model of the Television Market (2/2)
7.3.1.3. Content Choice7.3.2. Evaluating the Simple Model7.3.2.1. Testable Implications7.3.2.2. What Can We Learn?
7.4. Extensions to the Simple Model: "The Four Bs" (1/4)
7.4.1. Public Service Broadcasters7.4.1.1. The Economic Rationale for PSBs7.4.1.1.1. A History of PSBs7.4.1.1.2. PSBs as a Response to Market Failure7.4.1.2. Effects of PSBs7.4.2. Bargaining7.4.2.1. Bargaining Theory
7.4. Extensions to the Simple Model: "The Four Bs" (2/4)
7.4.2.2. Bargaining Empirics7.4.3. Barriers to Entry7.4.3.1. Market Power in Wholesale (Programming) Markets
7.4. Extensions to the Simple Model: "The Four Bs" (3/4)
7.4.3.2. Market Power in Retail (Distribution) Markets7.4.3.3. Horizontal Merger Review7.4.4. Preference Heterogeneity and Bundling7.4.4.1. Bundling Theory
7.4. Extensions to the Simple Model: "The Four Bs" (4/4)
7.4.4.2. Bundling Empirics7.4.4.3. Welfare Effects of à la Carte
7.5. Open Policy Issues in Television Markets (1/2)
7.5.1. Wholesale Bundling and Competition in Programming Markets7.5.2. Vertical Integration and Foreclosure7.5.2.1. Vertical Integration7.5.2.2. Policy Responses
7.5. Open Policy Issues in Television Markets (2/2)
7.5.2.3. Vertical Merger Review
7.6. Online Video Markets (1/2)
7.6.1. Online Video Facts7.6.2. Net Neutrality and Foreclosure in Online Video Markets7.6.2.1. Net Neutrality and Online Video
7.6. Online Video Markets (2/2)
7.6.2.2. Foreclosure in Online Video Markets
7.7. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
Chapter 8: Radio
8.1. Introduction
8.2. A Brief History of the Radio Industry in the United States (1/2)
8.2. A Brief History of the Radio Industry in the United States (2/2)
8.3. Data
8.4. The Effects of Industry Consolidation on Market Outcomes: Theoretical Considerations
8.5. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Ownership Consolidation in Radio (1/4)
8.5.1. The Effects of Local Market Consolidation on the Advertising Market
8.5. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Ownership Consolidation in Radio (2/4)
8.5.2. The Effects of Local Market Consolidation on Product Differentiation and Variety
8.5. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Ownership Consolidation in Radio (3/4)
8.5.3. The Effects of National Consolidation on Listeners and Advertisers8.5.4. Economies of Scale and Scope
8.5. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Ownership Consolidation in Radio (4/4)
8.6. Excess Entry
8.7. Strategies for Retaining Listeners
8.8. Non-commercial Radio and the Effects of Competition Between Non-commercial and Commercial Broadcasters
8.9. Effects of Radio on the Music Industry, and Cultural and Political Outcomes (1/2)
8.9.1. Politics8.9.2. Contemporary Music
8.9. Effects of Radio on the Music Industry, and Cultural and Political Outcomes (2/2)
8.10. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
Chapter 9: Newspapers and Magazines
9.1. Introduction
9.2. An Overview of the Print Media Industry (1/2)
9.2.1. A Short History of Newspapers9.2.2. Partisanship in Print Media9.2.3. Newspapers and the Electoral Process9.2.4. Stylized Facts on Newspapers and Magazines
9.2. An Overview of the Print Media Industry (2/2)
9.2.5. Data Sources
9.3. Market Structure in Newspapers and Magazines (1/2)
9.3.1. The Number of Newspapers in a Market9.3.2. The Decline of Newspapers9.3.3. Economies of Scale in Newspaper Markets
9.3. Market Structure in Newspapers and Magazines (2/2)
9.3.4. Newspaper Chains
9.4. Newspapers and Magazines as Two-Sided Markets (1/2)
9.4.1. The Older Literature on Cross-Externalities in Print Media Markets9.4.2. The Two-Sided Market Framework
9.4. Newspapers and Magazines as Two-Sided Markets (2/2)
9.4.3. Pricing Issues in Print Media
9.5. Advertising in Newspapers and Magazines
9.5.1. Reader Valuation of Advertising: Theory9.5.2. Reader Valuation of Advertising: Empirics9.5.3. Multi-Homing9.5.4. The Determinants of Advertising Rates
9.6. Antitrust Issues in Newspapers and Magazines (1/2)
9.6.1. Mergers9.6.2. Newspaper Joint Operating Agreements
9.6. Antitrust Issues in Newspapers and Magazines (2/2)
9.6.3. Vertical Price Restrictions
9.6.4. Cross-Ownership of Newspapers and Other Media
9.7. Print Media and the Internet
9.8. Thoughts for Future Research and Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
Chapter 10: The Economics of Internet Media
10.1. Introduction
10.2. Media and Advertising on the Internet: Some Facts (1/2)
10.2.1. Facts About Internet Media Use10.2.2. Facts About Internet Advertising
10.2. Media and Advertising on the Internet: Some Facts (2/2)
10.3. Providing Media Content (1/3)
10.3.1. Internet Media Consumption and Convergence10.3.2. Media Platforms as Gatekeepers10.3.3. News Aggregators and the Selection of News
10.3. Providing Media Content (2/3)
10.3.4. Search Engines and Media Content10.3.5. ISPs, Net Neutrality, and Media Content
10.3. Providing Media Content (3/3)
10.4. Users Choosing Media Content (1/5)
10.4.1. Consumer Choice with Multi-Homing and Its Implications on Content
10.4. Users Choosing Media Content (2/5)
10.4. Users Choosing Media Content (3/5)
10.4.2. Search Engines and Search Bias
10.4. Users Choosing Media Content (4/5)
10.4. Users Choosing Media Content (5/5)
10.4.3. Information Spreading on the Internet
10.5. Media Platforms Matching Advertising to Content (1/4)
10.5.1. How to Formalize Targeting
10.5. Media Platforms Matching Advertising to Content (2/4)
10.5. Media Platforms Matching Advertising to Content (3/4)
10.5.2. Keyword Advertising
10.5. Media Platforms Matching Advertising to Content (4/4)
10.6. Media Platforms Matching Advertising to Users (1/3)
10.6.1. Tracking and Personalized Offers
10.6. Media Platforms Matching Advertising to Users (2/3)
10.6. Media Platforms Matching Advertising to Users (3/3)
10.6.2. Advertising Congestion and Limited Attention
10.7. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
Index (1/2)
Index (2/2)
Back Cover

Content preview from Handbook of Media Economics, vol 1A

platforms’ choice of genre. In the third part, we discuss how to take on merger control in two-sided

media markets. Motivated by some actual merger cases, we also discuss how antitrust authorities might

err if they use the conventional one-sided approach to evaluate mergers within media markets (even if

a case-by-case assessment is undertaken).

Keywords

Two-sided markets, Mergers, Advertising, Multi-homing, Antitrust policy

JEL Codes

L11, L13, L41, L82

6.1. INTROD UCTION

Because it is media, media mergers get huge media attention. In the first dot-com era,

there was a wave of entertainment and media mergers, led by the 2001 American Online

(AOL)–Time Warner merger, in which AOL acquired the more traditional media com-

pany Time Warner for $165 billion. ...

Become an O’Reilly member and get unlimited access to this title plus top books and audiobooks from O’Reilly and nearly 200 top publishers, thousands of courses curated by job role, 150+ live events each month,
and much more.

Read now

Unlock full access

More than 5,000 organizations count on O’Reilly

O’Reilly covers everything we've got, with content to help us build a world-class technology community, upgrade the capabilities and competencies of our teams, and improve overall team performance as well as their engagement.

Julian F.

Head of Cybersecurity

I wanted to learn C and C++, but it didn't click for me until I picked up an O'Reilly book. When I went on the O’Reilly platform, I was astonished to find all the books there, plus live events and sandboxes so you could play around with the technology.

Addison B.

Field Engineer

I’ve been on the O’Reilly platform for more than eight years. I use a couple of learning platforms, but I'm on O'Reilly more than anybody else. When you're there, you start learning. I'm never disappointed.

Amir M.

Data Platform Tech Lead

I'm always learning. So when I got on to O'Reilly, I was like a kid in a candy store. There are playlists. There are answers. There's on-demand training. It's worth its weight in gold, in terms of what it allows me to do.

Mark W.

Embedded Software Engineer

Publisher Resources

ISBN: 9780444627247

Cloud Computing

Data Engineering

Data Science

AI & ML

Programming Languages

Software Architecture

IT/Ops

Security

Design

Business

Soft Skills

Handbook of Media Economics, vol 1A

by Simon P. Anderson, Joel Waldfogel, David Stromberg

Become an O’Reilly member and get unlimited access to this title plus top books and audiobooks from O’Reilly and nearly 200 top publishers, thousands of courses curated by job role, 150+ live events each month,
and much more.

More than 5,000 organizations count on O’Reilly

Julian F.

Addison B.

Amir M.

Mark W.

You might also like

Handbook of Media Economics, vol 1B

Handbook of Frontier Markets

Complex Decision-Making in Economy and Finance

How to Develop a Great Digital Strategy

Publisher Resources