Notes
164
that I know that it is poisoned. However, the fundamental or basic
justification for my having that duty is the nature of the person to
whom the duty is owed . . . she is rational, or sentient, or [substitute
your preferred characterization of a moral patient]—and her nature is
sufficient to ground.
See Diane Jeske, “Special Obligations,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2014 edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2014/entries/special-obligations/.
3. Moritz Kronenberg, Kant: Sein Leben und Seine Lehre (Munich:
C. H. Bedsche Buchverhandlung, 1904), 133.
4. An alternative way of reaching the same conclusion is presented
in Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western
Liberalis ...