Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security, 4 Volume Set

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SENSORS

R. M. MAYO¹

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, D.C.

D. L. STEPHENS²

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington

1 INTRODUCTION

The likelihood of a radiological or nuclear (RN) attack on the United States or its allies is a subject of contemporary debate and concern [1, 2]. What is undeniable, however, is the potential consequence of such an incident, making the risk unacceptable to ignore. Means of preventing such events are many and diverse, and constitute much of the federal government’s efforts in nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. Such efforts include an array of activities like the establishment of treaties and agreements that limit the use of nuclear technologies and materials, and provide for enforcement measures like MPC&A (materials protection, control, and accountability) designed to secure nuclear materials in place at the point of origin or during transit. As well, safeguards are established by international agreement to secure nuclear facilities and processes against diversion of material [3]. Dismantlement of nuclear devices and facilities is also an integral part of establishing international nuclear security, as are capabilities to interdict stolen, diverted, or smuggled material in such programs as the Second Line of Defense (SLD) and Mega-Ports Initiative (MI) that monitor land border crossings and seaports, the Proliferation Security ...